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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GLEN H. WHITEHOUSE,

Petitioner-Appellant,
-v-

Case No. 20669

FRED C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief of
Driver License Services,
Department of Public Safety,
State of Utah,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS
Many facts have been stipulated to as mentioned in
appellant's brief.

However, in order to draw a more complete

refusal picture the following is presented to the court.
The discussion is taken from excerpts of the transcript
of the trial courts proceedings and reads:
A.

DUI, driving under the influence.

Q.

And subsequent to that arrest, did you ask him to

take a breathylizer examination to determine the alcohol content
in his blood?
A.

Yes, sir, I did.

As we were pulling away in the

car on the way to the South Salt Lake where the intoxilator is
located, I said, "I am going to request you take a breathylizer
test."

He replied, "I know.
Q.

I have been through it before."

Is that a direct quote?

A.

It's as close as I can come this far down the road.

Q.

But you could remember it or not?

A*

Yesf sir, that was the gist of his comment.

Q.

Then what was said between you and he?

A.

Then I said, "Then you know if you refuse to take

(T-6)•

the test, you may lose your license for one year?"
actually heard my comment about the refusal.
Q.

that he had

(T-6).

After this did you again ask him to take the test

and did he agree?
A.

I asked him to take the test, yesr sirf and he

Q.

So was the test administered?

A*

No., sir, it was not.

Q.

Did you ask another to administer the test?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And you took him to the South Salt Lake

agreed.

(T-7).

Sgt. Gillette.

breathylizer room; is that correct?
A.

Yes, sir, it's the squad room.

Q.

And then what happened or transpired in an attempt

to obtain that test?
A.

Sgt. Gillette came in approximately three or four

minutes after Mr. Whitehouse and I arrived at the office.

Sgt.

Gillette began to warm up the intoxilizer and prepared the
intoxilizer for the test.

During that time I went into the

locker room and brought my tape recorder in and began to tape the
conversation.
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Mr. Whitehouse, for the next approximately two or three
minutes, waxed eloquently about his situation and various things
he thought wrong with the state and other matters.

And during

that time I was questioning him as to his phone number, all the
pertinent data that you found here on the DUI report form at the
top of the page, his address and so on and so forth.
Q.

Was he able to give you that?

A.

Yes, sir, he was.

Q.

And were those responses t o your questions

A.

Yes, s i r , they were.

Q.

Did —

A.

No, sir, it was not.

Q.

Would you tell us who was present and what

voluntary?

now, you said the test was not administered?

transpired?
A.

Sgt. Gillette, after he had prepared the machine

and the punch card, asked Mr. Whitehouse if he was going to take
the test, and he replied —

test?"

may I refer to the form?

Q.

Yes.

A.

Agent G i l l e t t e said, "Do you wish to take the

And Mr. Whitehouse said, "No, I d o n ' t . " *

G i l l e t t e s a i d , "You d o n ' t want t o take i t ? "
answers, "No."
Q.

And then Sgt.

And Mr. Whitehouse

(T7-9).
Officer, did Mr. Whitehouse say or do anything at

t h a t time t o i n d i c a t e t h a t he understood t h a t if he did not take
t h a t t e s t he could lose h i s d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e for a year?
10) .

-3-

(T-9-

A.
years.

He stated, "I have been without a license for four

I might as well go another year without it."
Q.

And he used the words "another year without it"?

A.

May I refer to the transcript?

Q.

Wellr that's a direct quote.

A.

The t r a n s c r i p t reads f "Christ, I have went four and

(T-10)

Go ahead and refer to

it.

a half years without a d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e .
year?"

Why not go another

(T-10).
Q.

And do you remember him saying t h a t ?

A.

Yes, s i r .

Q.

In your presence and the presence of Officer

A.

Yes, s i r .

Q.

Then what did Officer G i l l e t t e say?

A.

"In other words, you're saying you're not going t o

Gillette?

(T-ll).

take the t e s t or y o u ' r e going t o take the t e s t ; which?
Q.

What was the response?

A.

"No, I am n o t . "

Q.

Do you know if Mr. Whitehouse knew whether or not

he was being — the conversation was being taped?
A.

Yes, s i r , he knew i t was being taped.

Q.

In f a c t , he said on there words t o the e f f e c t ,

"To

be honest with you, and I w i l l put t h i s on the recording," t h a t
he d i d n ' t want t o take the t e s t ?

-4-

A.

Yes, sir, I believe he used the term "on the

record," or "on record."
Q.

Then what happened next after he said he would not

take the test?
A.

(T-ll-12).
Then I believe Sgt. Gillette asked him again,

"You're not going to take the test?"
not."

And he said, "No, I am

And Sgt. Gillette made some comment about, "Thanks for

wasting my time," and shut the machine down and left the office.
Q.

Now, Officer, did Mr* Whitehouse ever make any

further request that the test be readministered to him?
A.

Yes, sir, he did.

Q.

Could you tell us the time element there and who

was present and what was said?
A.
Whitehouse.

The only two present were myself and Mr.
It was approximately three to five minutes after

Sgt. Gillette left that Mr. Whitehouse expressed his desire to
take the test.

I refused to allow him and I believe I explained

that that would involve Sgt. Gillette coming back and turning on
the machine and going through the same processes again.

And that

he had refused once, and I believe statutorily that was
mentioned.

(T-12).
Appellant had approximately one hour and ten minutes

after the stop to make the final refusal decision.

(T-16-17).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The police officer's decision to deny the appellant's
request to take the breath test, after his prior refusal was
reasonable in light of U.C.A. § 41-6-44.10(2).

-5-

The statute

clearly provides that any recantation to a prior refusal must be
done "immediately" thereafter.

Although the appellant may have

agreed to take the test approximately five minutes after his
emphatic and clearly understanding refusal.

The experienced

driver had at least one and one-half hours to make an informed
decision.

Furthermore, the appellant was fully aware of his

rights under Implied Consent due to past experience and was
obviously being recalcitrant towards his clear statutory duty.
In light of the statutory language embodied in the
statute and the appellants defiant refusal statements described
herein, the Lower Courts1 decision should be upheld by this
Court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNDER UTAH IMPLIED CONSENT LAW, THE
DRIVER HAS NO RIGHT TO REFUSE TO
SUBMIT TO A CHEMICAL TEST, AND CAN
ONLY RECANT SUCH REFUSAL IF HE DOES
SO IMMEDIATELY.
Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.10(2) as specifically
amended in 1977 reads as follows:
(2) "If the person has been placed
under arrest and has thereafter been
requested by a peace officer to submit
• to any one or more of the chemical tests
provided for in subsection (1) of this
section and refuses to submit to the
chemical test or tests, the person shall
be warned by a peace officer requesting
the test or tests that a refusal to submit
to the test or test can result in revocation
of his license to operate a motor vehicle.
Following this warning, unless the person
immediately requests the chemical test or
tests as offered by a peace officer be

administered, no test shall be given* »»,f
(emphasis added)

-6-

Appellant argues that a proper interpretation of this
section would permit an arrestee driver to continuously recant
his earlier refusal to submit to a chemical test for at least two
hours.

He urges that a prior refusal can be withdrawn if done

"within a reasonable time after his arrest and without evidence
of undue delay effecting the validity of the test results or
hardships on the police."
This interpretation is in direct opposition to the
obvious meaning of the statute and its intended purpose.

The

police would have to prove a hardship (or a lack of by the
driver) and the unclear issues of "undue delay," the refused
tests1 possible "validity and reasonableness" of times would all
then become issues clouding the clear statutory skies and
increasing the desire for litigation de novo.
In the pre-Utah amendment case of Campbell v. Superior
£aiir£f (1971) 479 P.2d 685, 692f the Arizona Supreme Court said
the following concerning their nearly identical statute:
In Arizona, A.R.A.f § 28-691, sub-sec.
D provides that "[I]f a person under
arrest refuses to submit to a chemical
test designated by the law enforcement
agency as provided in subsection A,
none shall be given." This language
does not give a person a "right" to
refuse to submit to the test only the
physical power."
The Utah Statute also says: "any person operating a
motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his
consent, "at the direction of the peace officer."... who shall
determine which test "shall be administered."
subsection (1).

-7-

U.C.A. 41-6-44.10

It is clear, that a person does not have the "right" to
refuse the chemical test but the question remains as to how much
time must the arrestee be allowed in which to recant agree and
submit to the test?

In Utah, subsection (2) is clear on this

issue where it states that:
"Following this warning, unless the
person immediately requests the
chemical test... none shall be
given." Id. subsection (2) (emphasis added)
The apparent meaning of the statute is that a person
can refuse to submit to the chemical tests thereby avoiding
contention but if he changes his mind, he must, immediately after
his refusal, request to take the test, thereby avoiding delay and
saving peace officers time.

All that is now required is a simple

"yes or no." Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (1979).
Appellant cites other states which support his minority
proposition that delay is O.K. if not substantial.
However, the statute was changed in 1977 to avoid delay and
confusion under prior cases under prior law. There is therefore
no need to adopt the reasoning or values of another state.
In the case of Holman v. Cox. (Utah) 598 P.2d 1331, the
court said:
"While a r r e s t e d d r i v e r has the r i g h t
t o refuse t o give statements t o a
police o f f i c e r , he does not have
the r i g h t t o refuse t o take a blood
t e s t . Cf. Schmerber v. C a l i f o r n i a .
384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d
908 (1966). The m o t o r i s t must choose
between p e r m i t t i n g t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
of a blood alcohol t e s t and refusing
t h e t e s t and running the r i s k t h a t he
w i l l l o s e his d r i v e r ' s l i c e n s e for a
period of t i m e . " (emphasis added)
-8-

The defendant argued that he was confused as to what
rights he had under the circumstances and refused to take the
chemical test for that reason.
The court went further to provide an objective test by
which the police officers and Courts could interpret the
defendants response as a refusal by saying:
Obviously the arresting officer cannot
know the subjective state of mind of
the person arrested and whether he
in fact intended his response to a
request to take a blood test to be
equivalent of a refusal that would
result in license revocation. The
test must be objective: otherwise
the whole statutory scheme could be
subverted by one who equivocates or
remains silent, and later protests
that it was his unexpressed intent
to take the test. However, the
behavior of the driver must clearly
indicate, judged objectively, that
the driver intended to refuse to
take the test. Id. p. 1333. (emphasis
added)
See Beck v. Cox, Utah 5097 P.2d 1335 (1979), and

Strand v. State Department of Motor Vehicles,8 wash. App. 877,
509 P.2d 999 (1973) for further authority.
In Beck v. Cox, Id. p. 1338, the Utah Supreme Court
held that "a licensee did not have the right to reasonably refuse
to submit to a chemical test."

The court then expounded on the

word "refusal" and asking "what constitutes a refusal" cited
Spradling v. Deimeke, Mo., 528 S.W.2d 759 (1975) as saying:
There is no mysterious meaning to the
word "refusal". In the context of
the implied consent law, it simply
means that an arrestee, after having
been requested to take the breathalyzer
test, declines to do so of his own
volition. Whether the declination is

-9-

accomplished by verbally sayingf "I
refuse,n or by remaining silent and
just not breathing or blowing into
the machine, or by vocalizing some
sort of qualified or conditional
consent or refusal, does not make any

difference.

The volitional failure

to do what is necessary in order

that the test can be performed is a
refusal.

(emphasis added)

In another Utah case where the facts were very similar
to those of the present case, the defendant was asked for a
fourth and final time at the jail house, whether or not he would
take the test.

The defendant refused to reply and the officer

filled out the refusal form.
(1979).

Beck v. Cox. (Utah) 597 P.2d 1335

The period of time that passed while the defendant and

officer were at the jail house was approximately 5 to 7 minutes.
Id. at 1343.
Therefore, the appellant only had that much time in
which to decide, possibly combined with the travel time to the
courthouse, for a total of approximately 30 or 40 minutes.

This

Court commented on this time period saying:
"Clearly, the plaintiff had ample
opportunity to learn the consequences
of his refusals to take a test and
sufficient time to fully deliberate
and even to change his mind." Id. p. 1337.
Furthermore, by the appellants own admission in the
case at bar, he was fully aware of the process entailed when
arrested for driving under the influence.

When the officer

indicated that a breathalyzer test would be requested, the
appellant responded "I know, I have been through it before."
22).

(T-

In fact, the appellant had already been without a license

for four years.

Therefore, the appellant had approximately one

hour and fifteen minutes in which to make a decision.
-10-

(T-16-17).

Furthermore, the appellant was requested to take the
test and refused very clearly with prior experience at least four
times to which the final time he responded to the request, "No, I
am not."

This Court in Beck v. Cox, discussed the question of

how an officer should deal with this situation most aptly in its
dicta by saying:
How many times should an officer ask
a driver, who refuses to give an
unequivocal answer, to take the test?
Should he be required to persist
and continue to repeat the request
until such time as the driver believes
that he has achieved a degree of
sobriety sufficient to pass the test
and is safe in giving a straight
answer? The consequence of such a

construction is to place a premium on
uncooperativeness and obstruction

that would likely inflame an already
tense situation. Certainly the
Legislature did not intend that law
enforcement officers be placed in

such an impossible situation or that
the purpose of the law should be so
easily evaded.

Id. p. 1337 (emphasis added)

Clearly the situation that the police were dealing with
when they arrested the appellant was impossible. Mr. Whitehouse
admitted he was well aware of the consequences and procedures of
driving while intoxicated and to having been without a license
for four years.

So he agreed to the test, waited, refused,

knowingly, more than once, and then waited until the machine wag
shut down to change his mind again.

We do not know how long this

would have gone on.
Such behavior should not be rewarded simply because
his change in mind was for only five to seven minutes.

The fact

remains that he already previously knew the consequences and

-11-

chose to forestall.

A reading of the transcribed tape provided

by Officer Midgley indicates as much.

(Admitted Exhibit #2)

Mr.

Whitehouse waxed eloquently on about the system and how he had
merely been trapped by such.

Stating that he would not drink if

the alcohol were not presented to himf the petitioner importuned
the officer to just take him home because he knew he would flunk
the test.

The petitioner, having admitted that he had been

through these procedures several times before, and in fact had
had his drivers license suspended for four years, reasoned
n

whatfs another year" upon making his final refusal.

Given these

facts, it is obvious that Mr. Whitehouse was simply playing games
with the officer.

Apparently, being aware of his own level of

intoxication, he knew that submitting to the test would provide
clear evidence of such.

He equivocated until the intoxilizer

machine was fully shut down, watching the entire procedure and
waiting until he knew that such was completed.

It is not argued

that a person who is confused should be given time to reconsider
his decision after having been presented a better explanation of
his rights.

However, to allow someone, fully cognizant as well

as practiced in his legal rights under Utahfs DUI laws to
equivocate, waste time, and try the patience of law enforcement
officers, is simply providing loopholes through which other
violator's of the law can squeeze through, ultimately vitiating
the value of our legal system to nothing.
Where the appellant's refusal had no basis in confusion
and he was given numerous opportunities to withdraw his refusal,
which he objectively knowingly continued to refuse, he should be

-12-

denied his driving privileges in accordance with the Lower Courts
order and the intention of immediacy in the statute as
interpreted by this Court in Beck v. Cox and Cavaness v. Cox,
POINT II
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 41-6-44.10(2)
SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO HAVE ITS
OBVIOUS MEANING, WHERE NO EVIDENCE
OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO THE CONTRARY
HAS BEEN PRESENTED.
Prior to the 1977 amendments this Court had ruled in
Hunter v. Dorius. 458 P.2d 877 (1969) that the individual had
seventeen minutes to two hours to consult with an attorney and
decide whether or not to agree to take the test or not.

This

defense of reasonable refusal seemed to also be upheld in 1975 in
Gassman v. Dorius, 543 P.2d 197 (Utah November 25, 1975)
referring to Hunter v. Dorius and deciding the case on its facts
where the defendant said that he would take the blood test if his
doctor was present howeverr he could not locate his doctor.

Then

in Hyde v. Dorius, 549 P.2d 451, (Utah April 23, 1976) the Court
said that there was no evidence of refusal and that a
constructive refusal was insufficient.
But, as this Court later pointed out in Cavaness v.
£QX,

598 P.2d 349 (Utah July 9f 1979), the 1977 legislative

amendments to the statute were made to "eliminate delays" and to
preclude the defense of "reasonable refusal as was contemplated
by said prior cases."

The amendments that the Legislature made

were an attempt to eliminate all delays by inserting the word
"immediate" and other statutory provisions such as crossing the
word "reasonable" out of the words reasonable grounds and

-13-

providing for "actual physical control" and specifically
providing that "no person shall have the right to select the test
nor shall the officer's failure to provide for a specific test be
a defense."

In the interest of administrative efficiencyf the

Legislature provided that "a peace officer" rather than an
"arresting" officer should determine, crossing without the
wording "within reason," which of the aforesaid tests shall be
administered.

The Legislature also inserted the provision that

the failure or inability to obtain an additional test would not
affect the admissibility or results of the tests taken, nnQL

preclude or delay the test or tests to be takenr" and that such
additional tests shall be "subsequent to" tests administered at
the direction of the peace officer.
Obviously intending promptness and efficiency, the
Legislature also added the subsection providing that the driver
could not consult with an attorney or physician as "a condition
for the taking of any test."

All of these amendments and more

specifically inserting the wording " unless such person
immediately requests the chemical test or tests as offered by a
peace officer, no test shall be given."
All of these amendments combined with the 1983
statement of intent that the primary purpose of the provisions of
this code "that relate to suspension or revocation of a persons
license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle... for refusing
to take a chemical test provided for in U.C.A. § 41-6-44.10, is
safely protecting persons on the roads and on the highways by
quickly removing from those roads and highways persons who have

-14-

shown they are safety hazards... by refusing to take a chemical
test that complies with the requirements of U.C.A. § 41-6-44.10,"
show a clear legislative intention towards immediacy and no
delays, allowing the officer to get back on the road where he
belongs.
That intention was clearly discerned by this Court in
Cavaness v. Coxr Id. p. 352, where again this Court said:
"We therefore pass to the final point
on appeal, that of a right to reasonably
refuse to submit to a chemical test.
Plaintiff cites certain Utah cases
interpreting prior law as recognizing
a reasonable refusal to submit to a
chemical test. However, the statute
has since been amended to expressly
declare that for the purpose of
determining whether to submit to a
chemical test or test, the person to
be tested shall not have the right
to consult an attorney nor shall such
person be permitted to have an
attorney... present as a condition
for the taking of any test.
The foregoing amendment precludes

the defense of reasonable refusal
as was contemplated by said prior

cases and now provides for a simple
yes or no t o the o f f i c e r ' s request,
the obvious l e g i s l a t i v e purpose
being t o eliminate delays in the
taking of the t e s t in l i g h t of the
fact t h a t alcohol quickly d i s s i p a t e s
with the passage of time." (emphasis
added)
The essence of the present controversy i s founded on
the issue of whether or not the purpose and wording of U.C.A. §
41-6-44.10(2) would require a l i t e r a l d e f i n i t i o n of the use of
the word "immediately 11 t h e r e i n .

-15-

Generally, the variance in possible interpretations of
"immediately" is minimal at most.

Definitions range from strict

views requiring action to occur forthwith or "next"; to requiring
action to occur within a reasonable amount of time, considering
the pertinent circumstances.

Some examples of such definitions

follow:
Immediately. Without interval of time,
without delay, straightway, or without
any delay or lapse of time. Drumbar v.
Jeddo-Highland Coal Co», 155 Pa.Super.
57, 37,1 A.2d 25, 27. The words
"immediately and "forthwith" have
generally the same meaning. They are
stronger than the expression "within
a reasonable time" and imply prompt
vigorous action without any delay.

Alsam Holding COt Vt Consolidated
Taxpayers Mutt Ins. Co>r 4 N.Y.s.2d
498, 505, 167 Misc. 732. Blacks Law
Dictionary 675 (5th ed. 1969)
immediate adj. 1. occurring without
delay. 2. of or pertaining to the
present time. 3. following without
a lapse of time. 4. having no object
or space intervening. 5. without
intervening medium or agent.

Random House Dictionary 443 (1980)
"Immediately" means in direct connection
or relation, in a way to concern or
affect directly or closely; without

intervention of any person or thing;
proximately. Etter v. Blue Diamond
Coal Co.. 215 S.W.2d 803, 806, 187
Tenn. 407. (emphasis added)
"Immediately" is not a word of precise
signification and does not necessarily
import the exclusion of all interval of
time or space, but its meaning must be
determined by the context in which it
was used and the purpose for which
the statute using the word was enacted.

Umberger v, Koopr 72 s.E.2d 370, 375
194 Va. 123.

(emphasis added)
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In reading the above definitions it is clear that the
most widely accepted interpretation subscribes to the view that
the act should follow directly from the cause and purpose of the
statute.

Apparently, the only time such a majority view is not

followed is when such a disposition of the cause and effect are
practically or realistically impossible.
"It is a general rule of statutory construction that
the words of a statute will be interpreted in their ordinary
acceptation and significance, and the meaning commonly attributed
to them.

Jones v. Liberty Glass Co.. 332 U.S. 524, 92 L.Ed. 142,

68 s.ct. 229; Rosennan v. United States, 323 u.s. 658, 89 L.Ed.
535, 65 S.Ct. 536; Cannon v. McDonald. 615 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Utah
1980).
In the present case this rule should be followed.

A

common meaning that would be attributed to U.C.A. § 41-6-44.10(2)
is that an arrestee would be required to recant his refusal
moments after having made it.

In Utah, our Supreme Court has

made one exception to this rule, and that is in the case where an
arrestee manifests confusion to the officer as to what his rights
are.

See Holman v. Cox.

In the event that confusion is

manifested, the officer has a duty to carefully explain the
rights provided for the arrestee under Implied Consent Law.
When there is apparent confusion
arising from a failure of an arrestee
to understand the demand for a blood
test and the rights accorded under
a Miranda warning, the officer must
give a clear explanation of the duties
and rights of the arrestee. An officer
properly discharges his duty if he
gives an explanation that a person
of reasonable intelligence, who is
-17-

in command of his sensesf would
understand. Muir v. Cox, (Utah) 611
P.2d 384, 386 (1980).
Aside from this one exception, there is no reason why
an arrestee should be able to equivocate on his duties to submit
to a test.
The Utah Supreme Court has required that an objective
test be applied to the arrested person, stating:

"The test must be objective; otherwise
the whole statutory scheme could be
subverted by one who equivocates or
remains silent, and later protests
that it was his unexpressed intent
to take the tests. However, the
behavior of the driver must clearly
indicate, judged objectively, that
the driver intended to refuse to take
the test. See Holman v. Coy, 598 P.2d
at 1333. (emphasis added)
This same objection test was applied by the trial Court to the
immediacy and sincerity of appellant's changes of mind.
It is obvious that a literal meaning attributed to the
statute, the word immediate, no defense, and officer shall
determine in question could only serve the purposes of improving
administrative efficiency by requiring a prompt yes or no, as
well as making Utah highways a safer place to drive.

An aphorism

stated by the California Court in People v. Duroncekey, as far
back as 1957, still cogently applies to us today noted that:
"In a day when excessive loss of life
and property is caused by inebriated
drivers, an imperative need exists for
a fair, efficient, and accurate system
of detection, enforcement and, hence
prevention." 48 Cal.2d 766, 772, 312
P.2d 690 (1957).

-18-

There is no doubt, in light of the foregoing statement,
that the problems the State of Utah is experiencing on its
highways today are identical to those experienced in 1957. One
way to implement a "fair and efficient" system which may militate
against this problem is to interpret U.C.A. § 41-6-44.10(2),
literally.
There is a prima facie preference in
favor of the literal meaning of the
words of a statute, and the general
rule requires an adherence to the
letter thereof. The language of a
statute is to be construed literally
where there is no reason why it
should not be so interpreted. Accordingly,
any construction which contradicts
the letter of a statute should be
carefully scrutinized, and applied
with caution and circumspection
73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 208.
A literal interpretation of the statute grants fairness
to the inebriated arrestee where he is protected from having to
act while confused as to his rights.

Special duties are imposed

(i.e. the officer has a duty to explain the Implied Consent Law)
which act to protect those who are truly unable to discern the
difference between their Miranda rights and their rights under
the Implied Consent Law.

However, for those who are objectively

found to be simply recalcitrant, or who choose to stall from
taking the test, a literal interpretation of the statute provides
a viable remedy consistent with legislative intent.
Appellant cites Lund v. Hjelle. 224 N.W.2d 552 (N.D.
1974) for the proposition that:
Since the accuracy of a chemical test
under Chapter 39-20 does not depend
upon its being administered immediately
after an arrest, accident or other
-19-

eventf and thus a delay for a reasonable
period of time while an arrested person
considers or reconsiders a decision
whether or not to submit to a chemical
test will not frustrate the object of
the Legislature in enacting Chapter 39-20."
Though this statement by the court is accurate in part,
it fails to take into consideration administrative efficiency.
It can hardly be denied that in this age of rising crime rates,
the effective use of our police force is of critical importance.
It follows most logically that the use of our police
force for the purpose of importuning recalcitrant arrestees for
two hours or more at a time to simply perform the duties that
they have previously consented to doing, is not efficient.

If

the statute and word "immediately11 is read literally, it still
follows that officers will be required to give the arrestee an
opportunity to take the test.

If the arrestee is confused as to

his rights, the officer is obligated to expound further.

Such a

procedure leaves no room for game playing and consequently will
not allow for a waste of an officer's time.
In shortf only a literal untechnical interpretation of
U.C.A. § 41-6-44.10(2) will act to provide a fair and efficient
means of dealing with drunk drivers.

The only possible abuse of

such a reading has been safeguarded against by the Utah Supreme
Court requiring that after an arrestee has manifested confusion
concerning his rights under the Implied Consent Lawf an officer
has a duty to expound further.

Such a reading of the statute not

only provides justice to the arrestee but it also concomitantly
addresses the critical concerns of administrative efficiency and
judicial integrity in this area.

After having had ones rights
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Ch. 268
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|C,,), Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be basal upon grams
of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.
(d) Ever} person w ho is convicted of a violation of this section shall be
punished by imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor more than 6
months, or by a fine of not less than $100 nor more than $299, or by both
such fine and imprisonment; provided that in the event such person shall
have inflicted a bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having
operated said vehicle in a reckless or negligent manner or with a wanton or
reckless disregard of human life or safety, he shall be punished by
imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, and, in the
discretion of the court, by a fine of not more than $1,000.
(e) A peace officer may; without a warrant, arrest a person for a
violation of this section when such violation is coupled with an accident or
collision in which such person is involved and when such violation has in
fact been committed, although not in his presence, when [4fce] a peace
officer has reasonable cause to believe that the violation was committed by
such person.
The department shall revoke the operator's or chauffeur's license of any
• '-on conv*V J - j* h> ^ecti >n.

Action 41-K-44 10, ' tah Code Annotated 1953, as enac:ec :- Chapter 80,
Laws of Utah 1957, as amended by Chapter 65, Laws of Utah 1959, as
amended by Chapter 88, Laws of Utah 1967 as amend^ ^ ru—^:r 107,
Laws of Utah 1969, is am.end.ed to read:
41-6" i 1,10* Implied consent to chemical, breath, blood or urine tests for
alcoholic content of blood at option of officer—Refusal to allow—
Revocation of license—Court action on revocation—Person incapable
of refusal—Results of test available—Who may give test—No right to
have attorney present.
(a) Any person operating a motor vehiek .-• • rns state shall be deemed
to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, [«•]
blood, or urine for the purpose of determining [the olooholie content of his
blood] whether he was driving or in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of
alcohol and any drug, provided that such test is or tests are administered at
the direction of a peace officer having [poaoonablc] grounds t* relieve such
person to have been, driving [in an intoxicated conditio
- ;n act.:a
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physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug
[The arrooting] A peace
officer shall determine [within roaoon] which of the aforesaid tests shall be
administered.
No person, who has been requested pursuant to this section to submit to
a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, shall have the right to
select the test or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of a peace
officer to arrange for any specific test shall not be a defense to taking a test
requested by a peace officer nor be a defense in any criminal, civil or
administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the
requested test or tests.
[4ty—Any pcroon operating a motor vehicle in thio otatc ohall be
determined to have given hio eonoont to a chemical tcot or tooto of hio blood
or urine for the purpooo of determining whether ho wao driving or vvao in
actual phyoioal control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of any
nareotic drug or other drug if arrootod for any offenoe whore, at the time of
arroot, tho arrooting officer hao roaoonablo groundo to bolicvo ouch pcroon
to have boon driving or in actual phyoioal control of a motor vehicle while
under the influoneo of a narcotic drug or other drug ]
ffe)] (b) If such person has been placed under arrest and has thereafter
been requested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the
chemical tests provided for in [oubooctiono] subsection (a) [or (b)] of this
section and refuses to submit to such chemical test or tests, such person
shall be warned by a peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal
to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of his license to operate
a motor vehicle. Following this warning, unless such person immediately
requests the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be
administered, P&e] no test shall f-ftet] be given and [the arrooting] a peace
officer shall [advioo tho poroon of hio righto undor thio oootion] submit a
sworn report that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been
drhing or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of alcohol and any drug and
that the person had refused to submit to a chemical test or tests as set forth
in subsection (a) of this section. Within twenty days after receiving [««
affidavit] a sworn report from [tho orrooting] a peace officer to the effect
that such person has refused a chemical test or tests the department shall
notify such person of a hearing before the department. If at said hearing the
department determines that the person was granted the right to submit to a
chemical test or tests and [without roaoonablo cauoc] refused to submit to
such test or tests, or if such person fails to appear before the department as
required in the notice, the department shall revoke for one year his license
or permit to drive. Any person whose license has been revoked by the
department under the provisions of this section shall have the right to file a
petition within thirty days thereafter for a hearing in the matter in the
district court in the county in which such person shall reside. Such court is
hereby vested with jurisdiction, and it shall be its duty to set the matter for
trial de novo upon ten days' written notice to the department and
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thereupon to take testimony and examine into the facts of the case and to
determine whether the petitioner's license is subject to revocation under the
provisions of this act
[444] ^cj Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition
rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any such chemical test or
tests shall be deemed not to have withdrawn the consent provided for in
[oubocetions] subsection (a) [or (b)] of this section, and the test or tests
may be administered whether such person has been arrested or not.
\^> i2L !
surh test or * :

*! ' P^son v\ho was tested, the results of
]<.^u- * •

[&] is! 0 ° ^ a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or [4aiy
authorised laboratory technician] person authorized under section 26-15-4,
acting at the request of a [poliec] peace officer can withdraw blood for the
purpose of determining the alcoholic or drug content therein. This
limitation shall not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen. Any
physician, registered nurse, practical nurse or [duly authorised laboratory
technician] person authorized under section 26-15-4 who, at the direction of a
peace officer, draws a sample of blood from any person whom [4he] a peace
officer has reason to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or
hospital or medical facility at which such sample is drawn, shall be immune
from any civil or criminal liability arising therefrom, provided such test is
; 4 ' 1,v ' i " i ^'' r - ,J according to standard medical practice.
••*-; J j The person to be tested [ohall be permitted to] ma>t at nis own
expense, have a physician of his own choosing administer a chemical test in
addition to the [eae] test or tests administered at the direction of [4be] a
peace officer. The failure or inability to obtain such additional test shall not
affect admissability of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction
of a peace officer, nor preclude nor delay the test or tests to be taken at the
direction of a peace officer. Such additional test shall be subsequent to the
test or tests administered at the direction of a peace officer,
(g) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test
or tests, the person to be tested shall not have the right to consult an
attorney nor shall such a person be permitted to have an attorney, physician
or other person present as a condition for the taking of any test.
(h) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests
under the provisions of this section, evidence of refusal shall be admissible
in any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to
have been committed while the person was driving or in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or
combination of alcohol and any drug.
Section 5. Section amended.
Section 58-12-30, 1 ?:u
<;i •>.... utnl !!)!>
Laws of I Itah 1969, is amended to read.
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